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KENTUCKY LAW
SURVEY
CORPORATIONS
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
Since developments in corporation law at the federal level
continue unabated, the format used in the past several
Surveys of dealing with these federal developments first will
be followed in the present Survey.' Attention will then be
given to a group of selected cases dealing with corporate prin-
ciples under state law.
Discussion of the federal developments will begin with an
analysis of two significant decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court relating to the scope and application of the fed-
eral securities laws. This analysis will be followed by discus-
sion of a case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dealing
with the liability of accounting firms in private civil suits
brought under the proxy provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The discussion will conclude with con-
sideration of a recent case from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals dealing with the measure of damages in open market
trading cases under Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rule 10b-5.
Discussion of state law developments will begin by re-
viewing a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts involving the legality of shifting vote requirements
for corporate mergers. Reference will then be made to a deci-
sion from the New York state courts relating to the exclusive-
ness of the shareholders' appraisal remedy and to a decision
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of
Illinois, LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Corporations, 68 Ky. L.J. 495
(1979-1980); Ham, Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham, Corporations, 66
Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Corporations, 65 Ky. L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Corpora-
tions, 64 Ky. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1974-75).
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from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with state
indemnification statutes. Finally, attention will be directed to
a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Kentucky relating
to the inspection of the books and records of a corporation.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Insider Trading
Perhaps one of the most significant decisions recently
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States
under the federal securities laws has been Chiarella v. United
States,2 in which the Court rejected the position that trading
on nonpublic market information could constitute a violation
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and
SEC rule 10b-5.4
Chiarella was employed by a financial printing firm to
process copy submitted to the printing shop before the mate-
rial was set into type.5 Among the documents so handled by
Chiarella were several announcing corporate takeover bids
that had been specially coded to conceal the identities of the
acquiring and target corporations.' The true names of these
corporations were not given to the printer until the night of
the final printing. Nevertheless, Chiarella deduced the names
of the target companies before the final printing and upon do-
ing so proceeded to buy shares of stock in the target compa-
nies.8 After the takeover bids were publicly announced,
Chiarella sold the stock so acquired at a profit.9 The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission initiated an investigation into
Chiarella's activities that resulted in a consent decree under
which he agreed to return his profits to the sellers of the
2 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
5 445 U.S. at 224.
8 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. Chiarella netted "slightly more than $30,000" as a result of these transac-
tions. Id.
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shares.10 Subsequently, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen
counts for violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act11 and rule
10b-5.12 He was charged with having willfully misused mate-
rial nonpublic information in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities" and was convicted on all counts. 4 His
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit,15 after which the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari."'
In affirming Chiarella's conviction, Chief Judge Kaufman,
writing for the court of appeals, took the broad position that
"[ajnyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives
material nonpublic information may not use that information
to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
10 Id. The printing firm also discharged Chiarella from his employment on the
day of the consent decree. Id.
1 The full text of § 10(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
12 The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
13 445 U.S. at 225. Chiarella was indicted under § 32(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which provides criminal sanctions for persons found in willful
violation of the provisions of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
14 445 U.S. at 225. The 17 counts were based on 17 separate purchases of shares.
Id. at 225 n.3.
:5 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
,6 Chiarella v. United States, 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
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disclose." 17 Commenting that the draftsmen of our federal se-
curities laws had "created a system providing equal access to
the information necessary for reasoned and intelligent invest-
ment decisions,"18 Judge Kaufman said that he did not be-
lieve the "disclose or abstain" rule enunciated in Texas Gulf
Sulphur9 should be limited to protection of shareholders
17 588 F.2d at 1365. Judge Meskill, in a dissenting opinion, took issue with such a
broad application of § 10(b), since he considered it an unwarranted departure from
prior law that had imposed the duty to disclose material nonpublic information only
on those persons having a special relationship with the company whose securities
would be affected by the information. Id. at 1373. He expressed particular concern at
indulging in such an extension of prior law when a criminal conviction was involved.
Id. His position was that if a market practice existed which undermined investor con-
fidence, "a direct attack on the problem through congressional legislation or SEC
rulemaking would be a more appropriate response than the uncomfortable stretching
of existing law engaged in by the majority here to cover the gap." Id. at 1376 (foot-
note omitted).
18 Id. at 1362.
19 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972). There, the court made
the frequently quoted statement that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed.
401 F.2d at 848. The information involved in Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, was in-
side corporate information regarding a major ore strike, and the persons charged with
unlawfully trading on the basis of the information before it was made public were
officers and employees of the corporation, persons treated as "insiders" within the
meaning of the "access" formula first announced by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in its Cady, Roberts decision and approved by the court in Texas Gulf
Sulphur. Id.
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission spoke of the duty to disclose as resting on two
principal elements:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness in-
volved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). In consider-
ing these elements the Commission added that the task was "to identify those per-
sons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs,
and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities." Id. Chiarella, of
course, would not classify as such a person since he was a complete stranger to the
company whose securities were being traded. Furthermore, the information he pos-
sessed was market information, not corporate information.
Market information has been said to involve information that affects the market
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from improper trading activities by their officers and direc-
tors,20 but instead should extend to market insiders-such as
Chiarella-who reap profits by use of market information at
their disposal.21 Noting the strategic position that Chiarella
held in the composing room of the printing shop, which gave
him "access on a regular basis to the most confidential infor-
mation in the world of finance, 2 2 Judge Kaufman remarked:
"For the securities markets to function properly, it is essential
that those who occupy such strategic places in the market
mechanism be forbidden to reap personal gains from informa-
tion received by virtue of their position." 23 On the assumption
that "Congress enacted § 10(b) to prohibit conduct that de-
stroyed confidence in the securities markets,"24 he concluded
that "[iut is difficult to imagine conduct less useful, or more
destructive of public confidence in the integrity of our securi-
ties markets, than Chiarella's. ' '25
Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court, rejected
the broad position taken by the court of appeals as to the
scope and application of section 10(b). Pointing to the ab-
sence of any statement in section 10(b) indicating whether si-
lence could constitute a manipulative or deceptive device, 2 he
referred to prior administrative and judicial interpretations of
the section that had recognized nondisclosure as constituting
actionable fraud under the section where there exists "a duty
to disclose arising from a relationship of trusi and confidence
between parties to a transaction. 2 7 This rule, he said, con-
for a company's securities rather than its assets or earning power. See Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market
Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799 (1973).
20 588 F.2d at 1365.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1368.
25 Id. at 1369.
2 445 U.S. at 226.
17 Id. at 230. In addition to the decision of the SEC in Cady, Roberts and the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur, Justice Pow-
ell referred to the prior decision of the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute, a bank that had assumed re-
sponsibility for acting on behalf of a group of American Indians who held stock in a
development corporation formed to manage assets representing their tribal holdings
1980-81]
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forms to the established common law position that "one who
fails to disclose material information prior to the consumma-
tion of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a
duty to do so.""s Therefore, he concluded: "We hold that a
duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information. '"29 Since Chiarel-
la was a complete stranger in his dealings with the sellers of
the securities of the target companies, it followed, according
to Justice Powell, that Chiarella breached no duty of disclo-
sure in trading with the sellers through impersonal market
transactions.3 0
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger, while agree-
ing that as a general proposition "neither party to an arm's
length business transaction has an obligation to disclose infor-
mation to the other unless the parties stand in some confiden-
tial or fiduciary relation,"8 1 felt this general rule should give
way "when an informational advantage is obtained, not by su-
perior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
means."8 2 This would mean, he said, that "a person who has
was held to have violated § 10(b) when two bank officers created a "secondary mar-
ket" in the stock without disclosing this fact to the Indians. 445 U.S. at 229-30.
68 445 U.S. at 228. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1977).
445 U.S. at 235.
30 Id. at 232-33. Justice Powell likewise rejected an alternative theory offered by
the government to support Chiarella's conviction under § 10(b) based on a breach of
his duty to the acquiring corporations in misusing confidential information submitted
to his employer by those corporations, on the ground that the jury instructions did
not embrace such a theory. Therefore, he said, "we will not speculate upon whether
such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach consti-
tutes a violation of § 10(b)." Id. at 235-37 (footnote omitted).
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens pointed to an additional barrier
that might prevent acceptance of the government's alternative argument: the pur-
chaser-seller standing requirement for plaintiffs under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in its opinion in the Blue Chip Stamps case. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). As Justice Stevens said in
Chiarella, "inasmuch as those companies [the acquiring companies] would not be
able to recover damages from petitioner for violating Rule 10b-5 because they were
neither purchasers nor sellers of target company securities, - . . it could also be ar-
gued that no actionable violation of Rule 10b-5 had occurred." 445 U.S. at 238 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
31 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 240.
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misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty
to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. 3 3
Chiarella, in his opinion, was just such a person, one who,
"working literally in the shadows of the warning signs in the
printshop, misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable
nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confi-
dence,"' 4 and who then "exploited his in-gotten informational
advantage by purchasing securities in the market, '3 5 conduct
violative of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 6
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice Marshall, reiterated a criticism he had di-
rected earlier at the Court. 7 Blackmun charged the Court
with continuing "to pursue a course . . . designed to trans-
form § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision
to one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all
too often makes investment in securities a needlessly risky
business for the uninitiated investor."3 8 While agreeing with
the Court that a "special relationship" could properly form
the basis for a duty to disclose under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5,3' he expressed the belief that this reading was too re-
strictive an interpretation of these provisions and said that
"persons having access to confidential material information
that is not legally available to others [should be considered]
33 Id.
" Id. at 245. There were notices posted throughout the printing shop that use of
customer information for personal gain was illegal and against company rules. 588
F.2d at 1363, 1369.
3" 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3" Id. Differing with Justice Powell, Justice Burger said that he found support
for such a position in the language of § 10(b) and of rule 10b-5, since, "[b]y their
terms, these provisions reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme." Id. at
240. He added: "This broad language negates the suggestion that congressional con-
cern was limited to trading by 'corporate insiders' or to deceptive practices related to
'corporate information."' Id. (footnote omitted). In a separate concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan agreed with the "misappropriation" theory expressed by Justice
Burger but disagreed with his position that the jury instructions were sufficient to
cover this theory. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
37 See Justice Blackmun's dissent in the Blue Chip Stamps case in which he
charged the Court with "a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a
seeming callousness toward the investing public." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 247.
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prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit
their structural informational advantage through trading in
affected securities. '40
Where, then, does the Chiarella case fit into the overall
picture of insider trading? One thing seems clear. It is evident
that a majority of the present Court is inclined toward a re-
strictive rather than a liberal construction of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 as they relate to insider trading.41 Only two of
the Justices, Justice Blackmun and Justice Marshall, were
willing to read the statute and the rule broadly enough to im-
pose liability merely on the basis of the possession of nonpub-
lic information absent the relationship of trust and confidence
insisted upon by the majority of the Court.42 It would appear,
therefore, that under Chiarella mere possession of nonpublic
information is not enough to trigger rule 10b-5. This decision
comports with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,43 decided by the
40 Id. at 251. Justice Blackmun appears to have adopted an "access" test based
on the possession of material market information similar to the one adopted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633 (1971), regarding material nonpublic corporate information. In Investors Man-
agement, the Commission rejected the contention that a violation of § 10(b) could
occur only where a special relationship existed. The Commission said:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corpo-
rate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to other
investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information
within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.
Id. at 644. This case involved an administrative proceeding brought by the Commis-
sion against a group of institutional investors who had sold their holdings of Douglas
Aircraft stock upon receipt of information from the Merrill Lynch brokerage firm of
an anticipated drop in the earnings of Douglas. Id. at 635-39.
41 This is, of course, consistent with the recent trend of Supreme Court cases in
the securities area. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977). For a recent
Supreme Court decision digressing from this trend, see United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768 (1979), involving a criminal prosecution brought under § 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.
42 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Five of
the nine Justices seemed to agree with the "special relationship" standard: Justices
Powell (who wrote the majority opinion), Stewart, Rehnquist, White, and Stevens
(who wrote a concurring opinion). While Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment,
giving a six-justice majority, he seemed to agree with the less stringent "misappropri-
ation" standard urged by Justice Burger in his dissent. See note 36 supra for a dis-
cussion of Justice Burger's standard.
43 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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Court four years earlier, in which mere negligence was treated
by the Court as not constituting sufficient conduct to trigger
rule 10b-5. Furthermore it remains somewhat unclear as to
just what degree of "special relationship" must exist under
Chiarella to bring rule 10b-5 into play, just as it has remained
somewhat unclear precisely what degree of scienter is neces-
sary under Hochfelder to bring a case within rule 10b-5.4 Per-
haps Justice Powell summed up the attitude of the Court to-
ward the nondisclosure cases when he said: "Section 10(b) is
aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must.be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to
speak. '4 5
Despite this strong language, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has sought to offset the effects of the Chiarella
decision, as it relates to tender offers, by adopting a new rule
14e-3 under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.46 Section 14(e), en-
acted by Congress in 1968 as part of the Williams Act regulat-
ing tender offers, is an antifraud provision, similar to rule 10b-
5, condemning "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices" in connection with a tender offer.47 Rule 14e-3 es-
tablishes a "disclose or abstain" rule for any person who pos-
sesses material nonpublic information relating to a tender of-
fer, information that he knows or has reason to know was
4 The concept of an "insider," for example, has been extended to a financial
columnist in Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979); to institutional
investors (as tippees) in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); and to a market maker in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
438 F.2d 1167, (2d Cir. 1970).
'" 445 U.S. at 234-35 (majority opinion). For a general overview of the insider
trading problem, see Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
46 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
47 The relevant portion of § 14(e) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request
or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition
to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
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acquired, directly or indirectly, from the person making the
tender offer or from the target company.48 It remains to be
seen, of course, whether the Court will be willing to sustain a
nondisclosure market information rule for tender offers under
section 14(e) that it was not willing to sustain under section
10(b). 49
B. Scienter
In another significant recent case, Aaron v. SEC,Q 0 the
Supreme Court considered whether scienter is a necessary ele-
ment in a civil enforcement action brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission to enjoin violations of section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,"' section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,52 and rule 10b-5.53
The scienter issue in this context became significant as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in the Hochfelder
case,54 in which the Court held that no private civil action for
damages can be maintained under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and rule 10b-5, absent "any allegation of 'scienter'-
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."55 Although the
"' 45 Fed. Reg. 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3).
"' In its release announcing the adoption of rule 14e-3, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission expressed the belief that the Chiarella decision "did not suggest
any limitation on the Commission's authority under Section 14(e) to adopt a rule
regulating trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer." See SEC. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) No. 569, L-3 (Sept. 10, 1980).
0 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). The full text of this section reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
I 2 For the text of this section see note 11 supra.
03 For the text of this section, see note 12 supra.
01 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185.
05 Id. at 193 (footnote omitted).
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Court thereby resolved the scienter-negligence issue as it re-
lates to private civil actions under rule 10b-5, the Court spe-
cifically refrained from committing itself on the question of
whether scienter should be considered a necessary element in
actions for injunctive relief under rule 10b-5.5" The failure to
resolve this issue resulted in the development of a sharp divi-
sion of opinion in the lower federal courts regarding the scien-
ter requirement, not only in injunctive actions under rule 10b-
5,57 but also in similar actions under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act. 8 It was to resolve this conflict that the Court undertook
to review the issue in the Aaron case.59
Aaron was employed by E. L. Aaron & Co., a registered
broker-dealer firm, in a managerial capacity.60 His responsibil-
ities included "supervising the sales made by . . . registered
representatives [of the firm] and maintaining the so-called
'due diligence' files for those securities in which the firm
served as a market maker." 61 One such security was the com-
mon stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp.,
which was engaged in the lawn care franchising business.6 2
Over a period of almost a year, two registered representatives
of the firm, in the course of conducting a sales campaign for
Lawn-A-Mat stock, repeatedly made false and misleading
statements concerning the future plans of Lawn-A-Mat and
its financial condition.63 Aaron was informed of these false
56 Id. n.12. The Court said: "Since this case concerns an action for damages we
* . .need not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an
action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id.
'7 Compare SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976)
(scienter not required) with SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (scienter
required).
" Compare SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
950, reh. denied, 441 U.S. 928 (1979) (scienter not required) with SEC v. Cenco, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. I1. 1977) (scienter required).
1 446 U.S. at 686.
60 Id. at 682.
a' Id.
62 Id.
63 The two registered representatives had represented to prospective investors in
Lawn-A-Mat stock that Lawn-A-Mat was contemplating the manufacture of a new
type of small car and a tractor, whereas Lawn-A-Mat had no such plans. They also
made projections of substantial increases in the price of Lawn-A-Mat stock as well as
misleading statements about the financial condition of the company, neither of which
1980-81]
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and misleading statements but took no affirmative steps to as-
sure that the two representatives would refrain from making
such statements in the future. 4 The Securities and Exchange
Commission filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Aaron and seven other defendants based on the
Lawn-A-Mat transactions.6 5 The Commission charged Aaron
with violating and aiding and abetting violations of section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule
10b-5, by failing to take adequate steps to prevent the em-
ployees under his supervision from engaging in fraudulent
conduct in the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat stock when he
knew or should have known that they were engaging in such
practices."6 The district court found Aaron in violation of the
three provisions through having intentionally failed to dis-
charge his managerial responsibilities and enjoined him from
future violations of these provisions.
Aaron appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, contending that the entering of injunctive relief
against him was erroneous because his actions were insuffi-
cient to support a finding of scienter.68 The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment without committing itself on the ques-
tion of whether Aaron's conduct was sufficient to support a
finding of scienter.69 Such a determination was not necessary,
for the court said that, in the context of enforcement actions
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission to enjoin
violations of section 17(a), section 10(b), and rule 10b-5, proof
of scienter was not required.70
had any factual support in view of the fact that Lawn-A-Mat had suffered significant
losses during the period preceding the statements. Id. at 682-83.
" Id. at 683.
65 Id.
16 Id. The seven additional defendants consented to the entry of permanent in-
junctions against them before the case came to trial. Id. at 684.
67 Id.
68 SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 623 (1979).
19 446 U.S. at 685.
70 Id. In arriving at its conclusion that scienter should not be required in SEC
enforcement actions, the court of appeals stressed what it considered to be the differ-
ent policy considerations applicable to government enforcement actions as contrasted
with private damage actions, saying:
[Vol. 69
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 1 and concluded
that, while the Commission must establish scienter in civil in-
junction actions under section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5, it need not estab-
lish scienter in actions to enjoin violations of sections 17(a)(2)
and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.7 12 In reaching these conclusions,
the Court relied heavily, as it had done in Hochfelder, on the
language used in the applicable statutory provisions.7 3 In the
Hochfelder case, for example, the Court had treated the
phrase "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
in section 10(b) as language that made "unmistakable a Con-
gressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different
from negligence. 71 4 Noting that the Court in Hochfelder had
found additional support for its holding in the legislative his-
tory of section 10(b) and in the manner in which Congress had
structured the express civil liability provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, 5 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Aaron,
commented that "[in our view, the rationale of Hochfelder
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element
of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the
identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought. '7 6
Further, he said, "since Hochfelder involved an implied cause
of action that was not within the contemplation of the Con-
gress that enacted 10b, . . it would be quite anomalous in a
case like the present one, involving as it does the express rem-
edy Congress created for § 10(b) violations, not to attach at
Our decisions uniformly have held that a negligence standard should be ap-
plied in a government enforcement action because such actions are brought
for the purpose of providing maximum protection for the investing public,
as contrasted with the purpose of private damage actions which are brought
to obtain monetary relief for individual investors.
605 F.2d at 621.
" Aaron v. SEC, 445 U.S. 902 (1979) (granting certiorari).
12 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 701-02 (decision on the merits).
73 In Hochfelder, Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, prefaced his discussion
of the scienter requirement with the statement that "[i]n addressing this question, we
turn first to the language of § 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself,'" quoting from his concurring opinion
in Blue Chip Stamps. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
71 Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
71 446 U.S. at 690.
71 Id. at 691.
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least as much significance to the fact that the statutory lan-
guage and its legislative history support a scienter
requirement. '77
Using a similar approach in his analysis of section 17(a),
Justice Stewart said that the language of section 17(a)(1),
which refers to the employment of "any device, scheme, or ar-
tifice to defraud," plainly evinced "an intent on the part of
Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional miscon-
duct. '7 s On the other hand, he said that the language of sec-
tion 17(a)(2), which refers to persons who obtain money or
property "by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact," was "devoid of any
suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement ' 79 and that
the language of section 17(a)(3), which refers to persons who
engage "in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit," quite
plainly focused "upon the effect of particular conduct on
members of the investing public, rather than upon the culpa-
bility of the person responsible."8 0 He found nothing unusual
77 Id. Responding to an argument that the Court's opinion in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), should govern rather than the
Court's opinion in Hochfelder, Justice Stewart emphasized that the statutory provi-
sion involved in Capital Gains regulated a special fiduciary relationship between an
investment advisor and his client that would not have required an intent to defraud
even in a common law action for money damages. 446 U.S. at 694. Therefore, he said,
"[i]t is our view, in sum, that the controlling precedent here is not Capital Gains but
rather Hochfelder." Id. at 695.
In the Capital Gains case, the defendant, an investment advisor, published a
monthly report which it then mailed to its customers recommending certain securities
for long term investment. Before mailing the report, the defendant would purchase
the recommended securities on the market and then, when the price rose after cus-
tomers received the report, would sell the securities at a profit. In rejecting an argu-
ment that the SEC would need to establish an intent on the part of defendant to
injure its customers as a prerequisite to being granted an injunction requiring defen-
dant to disclose its "scalping" practices to its customers, the Court made the observa-
tion that "[lit is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to estab-
lish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages." 375 U.S. at 193.
78 446 U.S. at 696.
79 Id.
" Id. at 697. Justice Stewart conceded, however, that a district court could prop-
erly "consider scienter or lack of it as one of the aggravating or mitigating factors to
be taken into account in exercising its equitable discretion in deciding whether or not
to grant injunctive relief." Id. at 701.
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or disturbing in the fact that such an interpretation of section
17(a) results in scienter being required under one subpara-
graph of the section but not under the other two subpara-
graphs since he could find nothing in the legislative history of
the section indicating a contrary congressional intent.81
In a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun stated that he would
have affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in its en-
tirety. 2 While agreeing-with the position of the Court that a
showing of scienter was not needed in an action for injunctive
relief brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
under sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, he said
he found nothing in the language or legislative history of sec-
tion 17(a)(1) or section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to suggest that
the Commission must prove scienter to support equitable re-
lief under those provisions.8 3 Expressing the opinion that the
Court's decision in Aaron would require the Commission "to
prove scienter in many, if not most, situations before it is able
to obtain an injunction, 81 4 he cautioned that such a holding
"unnecessarily undercuts the Commission's authority to police
the market place. '85 Justice Blackmun noted that in some in-
stances it would still be possible for the Commission to obtain
relief for mere negligent conduct by sellers of securities under
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, while buyers are only covered by
rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act under which a showing of scienter
would be required. 6 He observed further that the Court's de-
cision had "drive[n] a wedge" between the two statutes: while
the seller's negligent misrepresentations could be subject to
injunctive action, the buyer must be guilty of more than negli-
gence, a result that prevents the two statutes from operating
in harmony.8 7 Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, replied
that it was not the Court that had driven the wedge, but Con-
gress, and that "[i]f, as intimated, the result is 'bad' public
81 Id. at 699-700.
82 Id. at 703 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83 Id.8, Id. at 704.
8' Id.
86 Id. at 714-15.
8 Id. at 715.
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policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can be
made."""
Whatever may be thought of the distinctions made by the
Court in Aaron, it may well be that the concern over the sci-
enter-negligence issue as it relates to injunctive proceedings is
merely a tempest in a teapot. As Justice Burger astutely ob-
served in his concurring opinion in that case, if the granting of
injunctive relief must be based on the likelihood of future vio-
lations, "defendants whose past actions have been in good
faith are not likely to be enjoined." 89
C. Proxies
Another issue pertaining to scienter left open by the Su-
preme Court in the Hochfelder case was whether a scienter
standard should be required for private civil suits charging vi-
olations of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ' 0 and SEC rule 14a-9,91 an antifraud rule pertaining to
Id. at 702 (Burger, J., concurring).
Id. at 703. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated that portion of its opinion that was inconsistent with the mandate of
the Supreme Court that scienter was a necessary element to establish violations of
section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b) of the Act, and rule 10b-5. It upheld
the finding of the district court that Aaron's inaction in failing to stop the misrepre-
sentations being made by the sales representatives, knowing them to be fraudulent,
constituted scienter under the securities laws. See SEC v. Aaron, [Current Binder]
FEDERAL SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,851 (2d Cir., Jan. 27, 1981).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). The full text of section 14(a) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a na-
tional securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in re-
spect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant
to Section 782 [§ 12] of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
The securities required to be registered under § 12 include shares of companies
whose stock is listed for trading on a national securities exchange and shares of com-
panies whose stock is traded over-the-counter if they have assets in excess of
$1,000,000 and a class of stock (equity security) held of record by 500 or more per-
sons. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
"1 Rule 14a-9(a) contains the following language:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
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misleading statements and omissions in proxy statements,
similar to rule 10b-5.
The lower federal courts have been inclined toward use of
a negligence standard in such cases,92 even where liability is
sought to be imposed on outside nonmanagement directors.93
Recently, in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,4 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was called upon to de-
termine whether an accounting firm could be held liable under
section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 for negligent conduct in connec-
tion with a proxy solicitation issued to obtain shareholder
approval of a merger.95 The merger took place between
Chadbourn, Inc., a hosiery manufacturer of moderate size lo-
cated in North Carolina, and Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., a
relatively small textile manufacturer operating in Tennessee. 6
After Chadbourn had become interested in acquiring the
stock of Standard, the shareholders of Standard at a special
meeting agreed to an exchange of their Standard stock for
Chadbourn securities.97 It was charged that Chadbourn's ac-
countant, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., had failed to point
out in connection with Chadbourn's financial statements cer-
tain restrictions as to the payment of dividends by Chadbourn
on securities being received by Standard shareholders for
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with re-
spect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1979).
92 See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (pre-
Hochfelder). In Gerstle, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, noting the broader
scope of rule 10b-5 as compared with rule 14a-9, commented, in connection with a
proxy solicitation undertaken as part of a merger transaction, that
a broad standard of culpability here will serve to reinforce the high duty of
care owed by a controlling corporation to minority shareholders in the
preparation of a proxy statement seeking their acquiescence in this sort of
transaction, a consideration which is particularly relevant since liability in
this case is limited to the stockholders whose proxies were solicited.
Id. at 1300 (footnote omitted).
'3 See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976)
(post-Hochfelder).
94 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980).
95 Id. at 424.
98 Id.
7 Id.
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their Standard stock in the merger."8
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee entered judgment against Peat, Marwick in the
amount of $3.4 million.9 The court based its decision on its
finding that Peat, Marwick had acted with scienter in regard
to the omissions in the proxy statements.100 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the district court's
findings of scienter to be erroneous 01 and, concluding that a
negligence standard would not be appropriate under section
14(a) and rule 14a-9 as applied to a firm of outside account-
ants, reversed the judgment of the district court.10 2 The court
of appeals said: "In view of the overall structure and collective
legislative histories of the securities laws, as well as important
policy considerations, we conclude that scienter should be an
element of liability in private suits under the proxy provisions
as they apply to outside accountants."103
In addition to the legislative history of section 14(a),
which the court felt showed a congressional intent that section
14(a) "would be applied only against knowing or reckless
wrongdoing of outsiders, '10 4 the court found additional sup-
port for its position in section 14(e) of the 1934 Act,105 the
antifraud provision pertaining to tender offers. As was previ-
ously noted in the discussion of the Chiarella case, Congress
adopted section 14(e) in 1968 as part of the Williams Act
98 Id. The suit charged that the conduct complained of violated § 10(b) of the
1934 Act and rule 10b-5 as well as § 14(a) and rule 14a-9. Id. at 423.
99 Id. The court added pre-judgment interest and attorneys' fees of $1.2 million
to the judgment. Id.
100 Id. at 427.
101 Id. The court said that they could find nothing in the record "to indicate a
desire to deceive, defraud or manipulate motivated Peat to omit from the financial
statement information regarding the applicability of long-term debt restrictions," but
that "[a]t most the evidence supports a finding that Peat acted negligently in prepar-
ing the financial statements." Id.
102 Id. at 436. As a consequence of its conclusion that scienter was lacking in the
conduct of Peat, Marwick, the court also reversed the judgment of the district court
imposing liability under rule 10b-5, adhering to the position of the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder that intentional misconduct is required for liability under rule 10b-5. Id.
at 428.
103 Id. at 428.
104 Id. at 430.
105 For the applicable text of this section, see note 47 supra.
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passed in that year to regulate tender offers. 106 Pointing out
that, in enacting the Williams Act, "Congress expressed the
desire that proxy statements and tender offers be governed by
the same rules and regulations,' 10 7 the court concluded that
the same standards of liability should apply to proxy solicita-
tions as to tender offers. 0 8 Since it was clear to the court that
the language of section 14(e) called for a scienter require-
ment, 0 9 the court felt that it logically followed that there was
a strong policy reason for imposing a similar standard under
section 14(a). 1 0
This decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, if
followed, has far reaching potential significance to profession-
als, such as accountants, who assist corporations in the prepa-
ration of proxy statements, since an imposition of liability for
omissions in such statements based on negligent error by such
outside parties could put severe additional strains on the ef-
forts of those outside parties to provide needed professional
services."' As the court of appeals remarked, "[u]nlike the
corporate issuer, the preparation of financial statements to be
appended to proxies and other reports is the daily fare of ac-
countants, and the accountant's potential liability for rela-
tively minor mistakes would be enormous under a negligence
108 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
107 623 F.2d at 430. Referring to the House Report for the Williams Act, the
court remarked:
Tender offers and proxy solicitations are two alternative methods of achiev-
ing the same result, corporate control; and Congress perceived that both
were subject to the same type of abuse. It therefore acted to eliminate an
existing loophole in the old law so that wrongful usurpation of control
would not escape securities regulation whenever one combatant chooses to
seize control by tender offer rather than by proxy fight.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 431. The court noted that the language of § 14(e) contains such words
as "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative," the kind of evil-sounding words
the Supreme Court in Hochfelder treated as indicative of an intent on the part of
Congress to adopt a scienter standard. This language, thought the court, indicated, in
light of Hochfelder, "that 14(e) requires scienter." Id.
11 Id. at 430.
m See Miller & Subak, Lessons for Future Counselling of Investors Involving
Ethics, Liability and Securities Regulation-Impact of Federal Securities Laws: Li-
abilities of Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. 387 (JAN. 1975).
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standard."112
D. Damages
One problem that has proven troublesome in connection
with insider trading litigation under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and rule 10b-5 has been determining the proper standard
to use for measuring damages in open market trading cases. " 3
This issue was considered recently by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,n4 a
tippee trading case.11
Elkind brought a class action against Liggett & Myers,
Inc. on behalf of purchasers of the company's stock. He
sought damages resulting from alleged wrongful tipping of in-
side information relating to the financial condition of the
company by officers of the company to financial analysts
whose clients sold Liggett stock on the basis of the informa-
tion received. 116 There were two such "tips" involved, the first
on July 10, 1972, and the second on July 17, 1972. Both
related to the possibility that there might be a decline in Lig-
gett's earnings figures for 1972.118 On July 18, 1972, the board
of directors of Liggett issued a press release disclosing prelim-
inary earnings figures that showed 1972 earnings to be down
112 623 F.2d at 428.
113 See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974). A threshold question in such cases is
whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the insider trading and the
losses suffered by those trading on the other side of the market. Compare Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (cause of
action recognized) with Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (cause of action rejected).
114 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,716 (2d Cir., Dec. 4,
1980).
Ho Liability of insider-tippers was first established in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), reh.
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972). Although the liability of tippees was not before the
court in that case, Judge Waterman, who wrote the opinion for a majority of the
court, spoke of tippee conduct as being "equally reprehensible." 401 F.2d at 853.
Later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized tippee liability in Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 228.
211 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,716, at 98,747.
117 Id. at 98,748-49.
118 Id.
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from the comparable 1971 period.11 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that
each of the "tips" violated rule 10b-5120 and that all persons
who purchased Liggett stock during the period from July 11,
1972, to July 18, 1972, inclusive, without knowledge of the
tipped information were entitled to recover their losses from
Liggett.121 In computing damages for the July 10 and 17 tips,
the district court resorted to the traditional out-of-pocket tort
measure of recovery in an effort to award the purchasing
shareholders an amount that would represent the difference
between what they paid for their stock and the value they ac-
tually received. 22 The court achieved this figure by following
the "Mitchell" formula that the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had used in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.1 23
Under this formula the district court looked to the actual
market price of Liggett stock at the end of a reasonable period
following the July 18 press release, which it considered to be
eight trading days, as an indication of what the price would
have been had there been public disclosure of the tipped in-
formation.1 24 The court then treated the damages as the dif-
ference between what the purchasing shareholders paid for
their Liggett stock and the price of the stock eight trading
days after disclosure.1 25
119 Id. at 98,748.
120 Id. at 98,749.
121 Id.
122 Id.
122 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), reh. denied, 404
U.S. 1064 (1972).
21 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,716, at 98,749-50. This
was actually a variation on the formula as used in the Mitchell case. The formula was
used there as a modified rescissionary measure of recovery using the concept of
"cover." The aim is to restore the injured investor to the position he would have been
in had he not been fraudulently induced to trade. Applying the formula there to per-
sons who had purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on the basis of an alleged mislead-
ing press release regarding a major ore find on the part of the company, the court
held that the measure of damages "should award the reasonable investor the amount
it would have taken him to invest in the TGS market within a reasonable period of
time after he became informed of the April 16 release." 446 F.2d at 105.
I2 [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) § 97,716, at 98,750. One
problem with the approach to the computation of damages used by the district court,
detected by the court of appeals, is that it assumes a parity between the "tip" and
the later "disclosure" that may not exist, and thus the "value" figure for the stock
1980-81]
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On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the finding of
liability based on the July 10, 1972, tip 2 ' and reversed the
damage award for the trading based on the July 17, 1972, tip
because the district court, in the opinion of the court of ap-
peals, had used the wrong standard for measuring damages. 27
The court of appeals did not believe that the use of the out-
of-pocket measure of recovery was appropriate for market
transactions since that measure of recovery, thought the
court, was designed for situations involving direct dealings be-
tween parties where one party has induced the other party to
buy or sell by materially misleading statements or omis-
sions. 28 In open market trading, however, reasoned the court,
the investors who trade have not been induced to do so be-
cause of insider trading, and therefore there is no direct
causal relationship between their purchases and the insider
trading.1 29 The real cause for concern under such circum-
stances, said the court, is "the unfairness in permitting an in-
sider to trade for his own account on the basis of material
inside information not available to others." 30 Allowing a tip-
pee with superior knowledge to enter the market, according to
the court, "poses the threat that if he trades on the basis of
the inside information he may profit at the expense of inves-
tors who are disadvantaged by lack of the inside informa-
tion." 31 On this basis the court determined that a "disgorge-
ment" measure of recovery appeared to be most
appropriate. 3 2 Under this approach, damages in open market
during the period of nondisclosure may be distorted. Id. at 98,756. Furthermore, as
the court of appeals also noted, the approach is based on the shaky assumption "that
one can determine how the market would have reacted to the public release of the
tipped information at an earlier time by its reaction to that information at a later,
proximate time." Id.
128 Id. at 98,758. The court concluded that the first tip on July 10, 1972, was not
material and lacked the requisite scienter to produce liability under rule lOb-5. Id. at
98,754.
.2 Id. at 98,758.
128 Id. at 98,754-55.
129 Id. at 98,755.
1230 Id.
131 Id.
12 Id. at 98,757. The court rejected a second "causation-in-fact" approach as be-
ing unrealistic due to the difficulty such a measure would impose on uninformed trad-
ers of proving "the time when and extent to which the integrity of the market was
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trading cases would be measured by permitting the affected
investors to recover any post-purchase decline in market
value, limited to the amount gained by tippees from having
traded before all parties had an opportunity to trade on an
equal informational basis.13 3
In support of the "disgorgement" measure of recovery,
the court pointed out that making tippers and tippees liable
for the gains resulting from their misconduct should have the
beneficial effect of deterring tippee trading, while the measure
additionally should prevent windfall recoveries having no rela-
tion to the misconduct.13 4 Furthermore, the court observed,
"[i]n most cases the damages recoverable under the disgorge-
ment measure would be roughly commensurate to the actual
harm caused by the tippee's wrongful conduct,"1 35 since "[iun
a case where the tippee sold only a few shares. . . the likeli-
hood of his conduct causing any substantial injury to inter-
vening investors buying without benefit of his confidential in-
formation would be small, 13 6 whereas, "[i]f, on the other
hand, the tippee sold large amounts of stock, realizing sub-
stantial profits, the likelihood of injury to intervening unin-
formed purchasers would be greater and the amount of poten-
tial recovery thereby proportionately enlarged. 1 37
As the court of appeals recognized in its concluding re-
marks in the Elkind case, there probably is no perfect mea-
sure of damages caused by tippee trading, but, on balance, as
the court said, "the disgorgement measure, despite some dis-
advantages, offers the most equitable resolution of the diffi-
cult problems created by conflicting interests."' 38
affected by the tippee's conduct." Id. at 98,756 (footnote omitted).
133 Id. at 98,757.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. This would meet one of the objections the court found to the out-of-
pocket measure used by the district court, which the court of appeals felt could result
in the "imposition of Draconian, exorbitant damages, out of all proportion to the
wrong committed, lining the pockets of all interim investors and their counsel at the
expense of innocent corporate stockholders." Id. at 98,756.
,8, Id. at 98,757.
3I Id. at 98,758. One possible disadvantage to the "disgorgement" measure of
recovery could arise in class action cases, such as Elkind, if the amount of profits
received by the trading "tippees" were so small in comparison with the number of
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II. STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Voting
Turning to recent developments in state corporation law,
the decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co.1 9 relating to shifting vote
requirements for shareholder action is of particular interest in
view of the growing use of high vote requirements in corporate
charters and bylaws as a defensive maneuver to thwart hostile
takeover attempts. 140
In Seibert, the board of directors of Milton Bradley Co.
submitted to the shareholders of the corporation a proposed
amendment to the bylaws of the corporation whereby an af-
firmative vote of the holders of at least seventy-five percent of
each class of the corporation's outstanding common stock
would be required for the merger or consolidation of the cor-
poration with any other corporation. 14' This action was taken
by the board of directors to offset the results of an amend-
ment to the Massachusetts Business Corporation Law that
had reduced the requirdd shareholder vote necessary to ap-
prove a merger or consolidation from a two-thirds vote to a
majority vote unless the articles of organization or the bylaws
of the corporation required a greater than majority vote. 42
The proposed bylaw amendment contained the additional
provision that if a proposed merger or consolidation were ap-
proved by a two-thirds vote of the members of the board of
directors of the corporation, the greater than majority vote re-
quirement by the shareholders would not apply. 43
class action plaintiffs that any individual recovery would be so insignificant as to de-
stroy the incentive to bring such a suit, thereby eliminating the private damage ac-
tion as one of the devices for deterring insider or "tippee" trading. See Note, Dam-
ages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 299, 314 (1974). Nevertheless, the proposed Federal Securities Code
recommends essentially this approach in the market trading cases. See ALI FEDERAL
SECURITIES CODE § 1708(b) (1980).
139 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980).
110 See Hochman and Folger, Deflecting Takeovers. Charter and By-Law Tech-
niques, 34 Bus. LAw. 537, 545-46 (1979).
141 405 N.E.2d at 132.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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Seibert, a shareholder in Milton Bradley, filed a suit in
the Massachusetts state courts alleging that if the proposed
amendment to the Milton Bradley bylaws were passed, it
would violate the shareholder voting requirements established
by the Massachusetts Business Corporation Law.""" The
Milton Bradley shareholders nevertheless adopted the pro-
posed amendment to the bylaws." 5 Subsequently, the trial
judge upheld the amended bylaw and dismissed Seibert's ac-
tion.146 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts affirmed the judgment of dismissal.147
In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts rejected the argument by Seibert that the bylaw amend-
ment, through the double voting standard, had the effect of
granting to the board of directors of Milton Bradley the power
to make, amend, or repeal the bylaws of the corporation. 148
The court reasoned that the two-standard system established
in the amended bylaw simply allowed the board of directors
to use their business expertise to decide how large a share-
holder vote should be required to approve a merger or consoli-
dation 149 and in no way permitted a merger or consolidation
to be approved without the vote of the shareholders as re-
quired by law.1 0
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court as to the legal-
ity of shifting vote requirements for shareholder action would
appear equally applicable to similar shareholder voting provi-
sions contained in the corporation statutes of other jurisdic-
tions, including those contained in the present Kentucky Bus-
iness Corporation Act.'5' The required shareholder vote for
approval of a merger or consolidation under the Kentucky Act
is an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares entitled to
vote unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class, in
144 Id. at 133.
,41 Id. Over 70% of the shares eligible to vote and over 85% of the shares that
were actually voted at the meeting approved the bylaw. Id.
146 Id. at 132.
147 Id.
,41 Id. at 133.
149 Id.
I" Id.
,5, Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 271A.005-.710 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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which case there must also be a majority vote of the members
of each such class entitled to vote on the matter.152 The Act
goes on to provide in a separate section, however, that the ar-
ticles of incorporation may require a vote of a greater propor-
tion of the shares (or of any class or series) than is otherwise
required by the Act.153 This latter provision would appear
flexible enough to permit selective use of a higher vote re-
quirement as well as to allow use of a fixed percentage vote
greater than a majority.'"
As the Massachusetts court pointed out in the Seibert
case, shifting vote requirements for shareholder action should
not be considered as "upsetting the balance between the legit-
imate interests of corporate management and those of the
shareholders by impinging on the shareholders' right to
vote," 155 since "[iut was the shareholders themselves who de-
cided that, absent an affirmative recommendation by the
1.2 KRS § 271A.365(2) (1981). The applicable provisions of this section read as
follows:
The plan of merger or consolidation shall be approved upon receiving the
affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote
thereon of each such corporation, unless any class of shares of any such
corporation is entitled to vote thereon as a class, in which event, as to such
corporation, the plan of merger, or consolidation shall be approved upon
receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares of
each class of shares entitled to vote thereon as a class and of the total
shares entitled to vote thereon. Any class of shares of any such corporation
shall be entitled to vote as a class if the plan of merger or consolidation, as
the case may be, contains any provisions which, if contained in a proposed
amendment to articles of incorporation, would entitle such class of shares
to vote as a class.
Id.
153 KRS § 271A.655 (1981). This section reads:
Whenever, with respect to any action to be taken by the shareholders
of a corporation, the articles of incorporation require the vote or concur-
rence of the holders of a greater proportion of the shares, or of any class or
series thereof, than required by this chapter with respect to such action, the
provisions of the articles of incorporation shall control.
Id.
154 Such an interpretation has been given to similar provisions in the Delaware
General Corporation Law. See Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., Del. Ch., Civ. No. 5631,
June 21, 1979. For a general discussion of the legality of differing vote requirements
for the same type of transaction, see Mullaney, Guarding Against Take-
overs-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAw. 1441, 1446-50 (1970).
15 405 N.E.2d at 135.
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directors, the proportion of the 'vote required to approve a
merger or consolidation proposal should be increased." 56 Re-
ferring to the amended bylaw in that case, the Seibert court
added that "if the shareholders become convinced that the
by-law is not in their best interest or in the best interest of
Milton Bradley, it is within their power to lower the merger-
consolidation voting requirement, or to remove the two-stan-
dard system. '157
B. Appraisal Remedy
An important question that continues to arise in connec-
tion with mergers and consolidations under state corporation
statutes is the extent to which the appraisal remedy provided
by those statutes on behalf of dissatisfied shareholders is to be
treated as their exclusive remedy. 158 This question was con-
sidered recently by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court in Breed v. Barton.'59
The suit in Barton arose out of a merger of Shepard Niles
Crane and Hoist Corp. (Old Shepard) into Shepcan Corp., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Vulcan, Inc.6 0 After consumma-
tion of the merger, Shepcan changed its name to Shepard
Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. (New Shepard) and continued to
carry on the business of Old Shepard.161 A group of minority
shareholders dissented from the merger and instituted ap-
praisal proceedings to obtain payment of the fair cash value of
their shares. 162 After some six years had elapsed, they brought
suit, individually and derivatively, against the corporation and
its directors for damages that they claimed they had suffered
as a result of the inadequate price offered for their stock in
1 ' Id.
167 Id.
"' The appraisal remedy is a right given dissenting shareholders in a merger or
consolidation (or other extraordinary corporate action) to be paid the fair cash value
of their shares. See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 349 (2d ed. 1970). For applicable Ken-
tucky statutory provisions, see KRS §§ 271A.400-.405 (1981).
11 428 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div. 1980).
110 Id. at 341.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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the merger agreement.163 The trial court dismissed the deriva-
tive portion of the complaint but sustained the portion based
on violation of the individual rights of the shareholders.",
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court re-
versed this decision on the ground that since the only relief
requested in the complaint was for money damages, the ap-
praisal remedy was exclusive.16 5 The minority shareholders
had argued that they were entitled to maintain their indepen-
dent action for damages under the exception in the New York
appraisal statute for conduct that is unlawful or fraudulent. 6
The shareholders had charged in their complaint that the di-
rectors of Old Shepard either knew or should have known at
the time of the merger of misleading statements in connection
with the merger.1 67 Nevertheless, said the court, "[a]lthough
the complaint before us alleges fraud, misrepresentation and
overreaching, there is a fatal absence of any primary request
for injunctive relief," 68 the only type of relief that the court
seemed to think was sanctioned by the exception to the ap-
praisal remedy.6 9
Thus, at least under New York law, whatever exception is
available to the exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy would
appear to be in the form of equitable relief by way of injunc-
tion or rescission rather than by money damages.1 7 0 Else-
16 Id. at 341-42. The amount sought in damages amounted to $56 per share of
Old Shepard stock based on the difference between the price of Old Shepard stock
prior to the merger and the value of Vulcan preferred stock given in exchange for the
Old Shepard shares. Id. at 342.
1" Id. at 342.
165 Id. at 343.
166 Id. at 342. The applicable provision in the New York appraisal statute reads:
The enforcement by a shareholder of his right to receive payment for
his shares in the manner provided herein shall exclude the enforcement by
such shareholder of any other right to which he might otherwise be entitled
by virtue of share ownership ... except that this section shall not exclude
the right of such shareholder to bring or maintain an appropriate action to
obtain relief on the ground that such corporate action wll be or is unlawful
or fraudulent as to him.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(k) (McKinney's 1980-81 Supp.).
167 428 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
168 Id. at 343.
169 Id.
170 This seems to be the general rule in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g.,
Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 34 S.E.2d 244 (Va. 1945). See generally Vor-
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where, however, even the availability of equitable relief as an
alternative to the appraisal remedy is not always clear.17 1 The
appraisal provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation
Act, for example, which follow the provisions of the ABA
Model Business Corporation Act as they read at the time
Kentucky adopted its present corporation statute,17 2 state
that any shareholder failing to make the demand for payment
of his shares within the time required by the Act "shall be
bound by the terms of the proposed corporate action." ' The
provisions further state that any shareholder who makes such
a demand is entitled only to payment for his shares and "shall
not be entitled to vote or to exercise any other rights of a
shareholder."' Comments to these provisions in Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act Annotated indicate that these provisions
have the effect of making the appraisal remedy exclusive. 1 5
What remains unclear, however, is whether such exclusivity is
intended to bar equitable relief where "fraud or illegality" is
charged.176 In 1978, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
approved extensive changes to the appraisal provisions of the
Model Act,17 7 which, among other modifications, adds an ex-
enberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L.
R.v. 1189 (1964).
171 See Note, Interplay of Rights of Stockholders Dissenting From Sale of Cor-
porate Assets, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 251 (1958).
172 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT 81 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL Ac]. The Model Act, which was drafted by the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association, was adopted in substantial part by Kentucky in 1972. See Ham, Ken-
tucky Adopts a New Business Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73 (1972).
173 KRS § 271A.405(1) (1981).
174 KRS § 271A.405(1) (1981).
175 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac ANN. § 81 2 (1971).
176 Some commentators seem to assume that a more or less inherent jurisdiction
exists in courts to interfere in transactions where fraud is involved. For example,
George D. Gibson, former chairman of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, once
wrote in connection with recapitalization plans: "Where fraud is alleged, all of the
new corporation codes contemplate that the courts shall have jurisdiction, on timely
application, to prevent the consummation of a plan. In some statutes, this is express.
In the Model Act and similar legislation, it is equally presupposed." Gibson, How
Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAw & CONT. PROB. 283, 297 (1958) (foot-
note omitted).
177 See Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dis-
senters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80 and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587 (1978).
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clusivity subsection to those provisions.17 8 The new subsection
specifically provides that the appraisal remedy shall be
deemed exclusive except in the case of "unlawful or fraudu-
lent conduct. 17 9 Comments to this change indicate that the
desire was to make the appraisal remedy generally the exclu-
sive remedy but to leave open the opportunity for courts to
recognize other appropriate remedies in cases where a corpo-
ration is proceeding unlawfully or fraudulently.""' It is in this
context that cases like Barton take on added importance in
suggesting the scope of those other remedies available through
judicial action.""s
C. Indemnification
A recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, In re Southwest Restaurant Systems, Inc.,182 under-
scores the important role corporate indemnification statutes
play today in connection with director and officer liability and
the limits such statutes impose on the availability of indemni-
178 MODEL ACT § 80(d).
178 The text of the new subsection reads:
A shareholder of a corporation who has a right under this section to
obtain payment for his shares shall have no right at law or in equity to
attack the validity of the corporate action that gives rise to his right to
obtain payment, nor to have the action set aside or rescinded, except when
the corporate action is unlawful or fraudulent with regard to the com-
plaining shareholder or to the corporation.
MODEL AT § 80(d).
180 The comments which accompanied the adoption of new subsection 80(d)
stated in part:
[T]he fact that shareholders can get paid off does not justify the corpora-
tion in proceeding unlawfully or fraudulently. If the corporation attempts
to carry through an action in violation of the corporation law on voting, in
violation of charter clauses prohibiting it, by deception of shareholders, or
in violation of a fiduciary duty the court's freedom to intervene is unaf-
fected. Because of the infinite variety of situations in which unlawfulness
and fraud may appear, the amendment makes no attempt to specify partic-
ular illustrations.
Conard, supra note 166, at 2596.
181 For an example of a case where a court recognized the principle of judicial
intervention to protect minority shareholders, see Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property
Corp., 115 N.E.2d 652 (N.Y. 1953), cited by the court in the Barton case. 428
N.Y.S.2d at 343.
182 607 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1979).
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fication in individual cases.183
Two shareholders of Southwest Restaurant Systems,
Greer and Harris, who owned two-thirds of the stock in the
corporation and who were two of the three directors of the
corporation as well as its only officers, were sued by the third
shareholder, McElhanon, in a suit that charged Greer and
Harris with wrongful conduct, including misappropriation of
corporate funds.""' Southwest had been placed in bankruptcy
at the time suit was brought. 85 Greer and Harris filed a claim
in the bankruptcy court for reimbursement of attorneys' fees
they had expended in defense of the McElhanon suit.188 Their
claim for reimbursement was based on a joint resolution of
the board of directors of Southwest, and of three other corpo-
rations of which they were majority shareholders and direc-
tors, directing reimbursement by the corporations of the at-
torneys' fees incurred in the McElhanon suit.1 7 The trustee in
bankruptcy of Southwest challenged the indemnification reso-
lution as failing to comply with the requirements of the
Arizona indemnification statute,188 the applicable statutory
provision. 189 The bankruptcy court denied the claim for reim-
bursement," and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed this judgment.1 91
The court of appeals found several defects that prevented
the reimbursement resolution from meeting the requirements
183 The right of directors and officers to receive indemnification for expenses in-
curred by them in corporate litigation was uncertain at common law. Compare New
York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. Mis. 1939) (reimbursement
denied) with Solimine v. Hollander, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J. Super. 1941) (reimbursement
recognized). See generally 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 6045.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1980).
184 607 F.2d at 1241.
185 Id.
188 Id.
117 Id. at 1241-42.
188Id. at 1242. Arizona adopted a new Business Corporation Act in 1975, effec-
tive July 1, 1976. See Cocanower & Hay, The New Arizona Business Corporation
Act, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 559 (1975). The new indemnification provisions are based on the
ABA Model Business Corporation Act. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005 (1977).
189 607 F.2d at 1242.
180 Id. at 1241.
'' Id. at 1242.
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of the Arizona statute.192 In the first place, the court found
the wording of the resolution itself deficient in suggesting that
the legal services for which reimbursement was sought were
individual to Greer and Harris rather than for the benefit of
the corporation.'93 Second, the court failed to find in the reso-
lution any statement, as required by the Arizona statute, that
the board of directors had made a good faith determination
that the individuals being reimbursed "'did not act, fail to
act, or refuse to act willfully or with gross negligence or with
fraudulent or criminal intent in regard to the matter involved
in the action.' ,,'94 Last, the court found no authorization in
either the articles of incorporation or in the bylaws of South-
west for the board of directors to adopt the type of resolution
mandated by the Arizona statute. 9 '
This case illustrates, where reimbursement is desired, the
importance of exercising care in the drafting of reimburse-
ment resolutions and the importance of complying with the
requirements of indemnification statutes.9 " Although the Ari-
zona statute required authority for reimbursement to appear
in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, stat-
utes elsewhere, such as those following the Delaware9 7 or
Model Act 9" statutes, do not require such authorization.'99
I'l Id. Speaking of the binding nature of the Arizona statutory provisions, the
court said:
We are of the view that this provision provides the legislative pro-
nouncement as to how all claims for indemnification must be processed.
Since there can be no doubt but that the state of Arizona has entire discre-
tion in the granting to a corporate body of rights and privileges which it
seeks to exercise, there can be no doubt but that these requirements are
binding on the corporation that sought to take the indemnity action.
Id.
I 93 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, JR., INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXEcU-
TIVE 188 (1963).
197 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
193 MODEL ACT § 5.
199 For an overview of the Delaware and Model Act statutes, see W. KNEPPER,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 19.07, 19.08 (3d ed. 1978). The
Committee on Corporate Laws has adopted extensive revisions to the indemnification
provisions of the Model Act. See A Report of Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corpo-
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Those statutes usually do, however, require that for voluntary
reimbursement by the corporation, as opposed to court or-
dered reimbursement, there must be a determination by a
designated person or group acting on behalf of the corporation
that reimbursement is warranted under the applicable stan-
dards of conduct provided for in the statute.20 0 Under the
Kentucky statute, for example, such a determination in the
case of corporate reimbursement must be made either by an
independent majority of the board of directors or by the
shareholders of the corporation.201 The Model Act adds as a
third alternative a determination made by independent legal
counsel selected by the board.20 2 Since the detailed require-
ments of indemnification statutes do vary, it is important that
the specific requirements of the applicable statute be carefully
noted and observed, a procedure apparently not followed in
the Southwest case. 03
rate Personnel, 36 Bus. LAW. 99 (1980).
20 Indemnification statutes typically distinguish between derivative actions and
third party actions in regard to the applicable standard for reimbursement. Under
the Model Act, for example, while in both derivative actions and third party actions
the person indemnified must have acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, there is an
additional limitation imposed in derivative actions that the person indemnified not
have been adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his
duties to the corporation. Furthermore, in criminal proceedings the person indemni-
fied must have had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. See
MODEL AcT §§ 5(a) & (b); KRS §§ 271A.025(1) & (2) (1981).
201 KRS § 271A.025(4) (1981).
202 MODEL AcT § 5(d). The language "independent legal counsel" has been
changed to "special legal counsel" in the recent revisions to the indemnification pro-
visions of the Model Act. The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws explained the rea-
son for this change as follows:
The characterization of legal counsel authorized to make the required
determination has been changed from "independent" to "special" as being
more descriptive of the role to be performed. This change is not intended to
indicate that legal counsel should not be independent in accordance with
governing ethical precepts. In the opinion of many, "special legal counsel"
should normally be counsel having no prior professional relationship with
the corporation or those seeking indemnification, who is retained for the
occasion, and should not be either inside counsel or regular outside counsel.
Comments to subsection (e), A Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note
199, at 114.
203 For a tabulation of state indemnification statutes, see W. KNEPPER, supra
note 199, at § 19.07.
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D. Inspection Rights
A matter of potential concern to shareholders in both
large and small corporations is the right to inspect the books
and records of the corporation. 04 The common law recognized
the existence of such a right if the request was made at rea-
sonable times and for proper purposes.20 5 Modern corporation
statutes generally confirm this right on a similar basis.206 Dif-
ference of opinion, however, has existed as to whether the
shareholder asserting the right must bear the burden of proof
of proper purpose or whether the burden of proof rests on the
corporation to prove improper purpose.0
This issue as to burden of proof was presented recently to
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Bennett v. Mack's Super-
markets, Inc.,2 8 in the context of a closely held family corpo-
ration. The plaintiff in the case, Patricia Bennett, was the
daughter of the founder of the business, Curtis Parsons, and
had inherited fourteen shares of stock in the corporation at
the death of her father.20 9 Before his death, Curtis Parsons
had transferred ninety shares of stock in the corporation to
Patricia as well as to each of his two sons.210 Patricia, how-
ever, had transferred her ninety shares back to her father
before his death.211 Several years after her father's death, Pa-
04 See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 159 (rev. ed. 1946). Access to stock ledg-
ers and shareholders lists can be particularly critical in proxy contests and takeover
tender offers. See Barnhill, The Corporate Raider: Contesting Proxy Solicitations
and Take-Over Offers, 20 Bus. LAW. 763, 766 (1965).
205 See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2214
(rev. perm. ed. 1976).
o Id. at § 2215.
207 Id. at § 2253.1.
208 602 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1979).
209 Id. at 144. Patricia retained two of these shares and divided the remainder
equally among her six children. The division of stock had the effect of causing the
corporation to lose its Subchapter "S" status for federal income tax purposes since
the division created more than ten shareholders. Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. After her father's death, Patricia demanded reconveyance of her 90 shares
of stock by the estate, but her request was refused. She then filed suit to recover her
stock and to enjoin the payment of any dividends until the status of the stock had
been determined. Later, she met with one of her brothers in an effort to negotiate a
settlement of that action. Her husband, a contractor and land developer who was
developing a shopping center near the properties of the corporation, was also present
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tricia filed suit against the corporation in Harlan Circuit
Court seeking to inspect the books and records of the corpora-
tion to determine whether any officer or employee of the cor-
poration had permitted any improper expenditure by the cor-
poration or any improper withdrawal from the corporation. '12
The corporation set up an affirmative plea that plaintiff had
not complied with the provisions of the Kentucky Business
Corporation Act relating to the right of inspection 213 and that
the relief sought was not for a proper purpose.-" Plaintiff
filed an affidavit asserting that her actions in seeking inspec-
tion were for a proper purpose. 215 The circuit judge, taking the
position that the corporation had the burden of proving im-
proper purpose, found for plaintiff and ordered the records of
the corporation opened to her.21"6 The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment.1 On discretionary review by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky, the decision of the court of ap-
peals was reversed and the case was remanded to the Harlan
Circuit Court for further proceedings.21
at this meeting and stated "that he would spend up to Two Million Dollars
($2,000,000), if necessary, to break the corporation." Id.
212 Id. 1
213 KRS § 271A.260(2) (1981). This section reads, in part:
Any person who shall have been a holder of record of shares ... at
least six (6) months immediately preceding his demand or shall be the
holder of record of... at least five percent of all the outstanding shares of
the corporation, upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall
have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or attorney, at any reason-
able time or times, for any proper purpose its relevant books and records of
account, minutes, and record of shareholders and to make extracts
therefrom.
Id.
214 602 S.W.2d at 144.
215 Id. Section 271A.260(2) of the Kentucky inspection statute goes on to
provide:
An inspection authorized by this paragraph may be denied to such share-
holder ... if he refuses to furnish to the corporation, its transfer agent or
registrar, an affidavit that the inspection is desired for a proper purpose
... and that he has not improperly used any information secured through
any prior examination of the books or records of account, or minutes, or
record of shareholders ... of such corporation.
KRS § 271A.260(2) (1981).
210 602 S.W.2d at 145.
217 Id.
21I Id. at 148.
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The Supreme Court held that the circuit court had pro-
ceeded properly in placing the burden of proof on the corpo-
ration to show improper motives on the part of the plaintiff in
seeking to inspect the books and records of the corporation.219
Noting that this represented the majority common law rule,2 0
the Court commented that there was little plaintiff could do
other than to state her intentions, which she had done in her
complaint and affidavit, and that "[a]t that point it was in-
cumbent upon the respondent [corporation] to go forward
with evidence to show that movant's request was not made for
a proper purpose. 2 21 Since the Court did not find any revers-
ible error in the finding of fact by the circuit court that the
corporation had failed to carry its burden of showing im-
proper purpose, 222 the Court remanded the case to the circuit
court for proceedings consistent with its opinion, which had
contained a direction to defendant corporation that it "open
such of its books and records as will be pertinent to a deter-
mination of whether any of its officers or any of its employees
has caused or permitted to be made any improper expenditure
or has made or permitted to be made any improper with-
drawal from it. ' '22 3
219 Id. at 146.
22 See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
2253.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1976). The Kentucky inspection statute also provides that, re-
gardless of the period of time during which a shareholder may have held his stock
and regardless of the number of shares held by him, a court upon proof of proper
purpose may order examination of the books and records of the corporation. See KRS
§ 271A.260(4) (1981). The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that shareholders fall-
ing in this class under a similar Oregon statutory provision must bear the burden of
proving a proper purpose in requesting the examination of the corporate books and
records. See Rosentool v. Bonanza Oil & Mine Corp., 352 P.2d 138 (Or. 1960).
221 602 S.W.2d at 146.
222 Id. The Supreme Court did not believe that the corporation's loss of Sub-
chapter "S" status because of plaintiff's transfer of stock to her children, or the pend-
ing suit brought by her against the corporation concerning ownership of the 90 shares
of stock and the paying of dividends, or her husband's threats to destroy the corpora-
tion were enough to make the circuit court's findings of fact "clearly erroneous." Id.
at 147-48.
223 Id. at 147.
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